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Abstract—Coupled with the rise of Deep Learning, the wealth
of data and enhanced computation capabilities of Internet of
Vehicles (IoV) components enable effective Artificial Intelligence
(AI) based models to be built. Beyond ground data sources,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) based service providers for
data collection and AI model training, i.e., Drones-as-a-Service,
is increasingly popular in recent years. However, the stringent
regulations governing data privacy potentially impedes data shar-
ing across independently owned UAVs. To this end, we propose
the adoption of a Federated Learning (FL) based approach to
enable privacy-preserving collaborative Machine Learning across
a federation of independent DaaS providers for the development
of IoV applications, e.g., for traffic prediction and car park
occupancy management. Given the information asymmetry and
incentive mismatches between the UAVs and model owners, we
leverage on the self-revealing properties of a multi-dimensional
contract to ensure truthful reporting of the UAV types, while
accounting for the multiple sources of heterogeneity, e.g., in
sensing, computation, and transmission costs. Then, we adopt
the Gale-Shapley algorithm to match the lowest cost UAV to
each subregion. The simulation results validate the incentive
compatibility of our contract design, and shows the efficiency
of our matching, thus guaranteeing profit maximization for the
model owner amid information asymmetry.
Index Terms—Federated Learning, Incentive Mechanism, Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles, Contract theory, Matching
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the advancements in the Internet of Things (IoT)
and edge computing paradigm, traditional Vehicular Ad-Hoc
Networks (VANETs) that focus mainly on Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications
[1], [2] are gradually evolving into the Internet of Vehicles
(IoV) paradigm [3], [4].
The IoV is an open and integrated network system which
leverages on the enhanced sensing, communication, and com-
putation capabilities of its component data sources, e.g.,
vehicular sensors, IoT devices, and Roadside Units (RSUs)
[5], to build data-driven applications for Intelligent Transport
Systems, e.g., for traffic prediction [6], traffic management
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[7], route planning [8], and other smart city applications [9].
Coupled with the rise of Deep Learning, the wealth of data and
enhanced computation capabilities of IoV components enable
effective Artificial Intelligence (AI) based models to be built.
Beyond ground data sources, aerial platforms are increas-
ingly important today given that modern day traffic networks
have grown in complexity. In particular, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) are commonly used today to provide data
collection and computation offloading support in the IoV
paradigm. The UAVs feature the benefits of high mobility,
flexible deployment, cost effectiveness [10], and can also pro-
vide a more comprehensive coverage as compared to ground
users. UAVs can be deployed, e.g., to capture images of car
parks for the management and analysis of parking occupancy
[11], to capture images of roads and highways for traffic
monitoring applications [12]–[14], and also to aggregate data
from stationary vehicles and roadside units that in turn collect
data of other passing vehicles periodically [15]. Apart from
data collection, the UAVs have also been used to provide
computation offloading support for resource constrained IoV
components [16], [17].
As such, studies proposing the Internet of Drones (IoD) and
Drones-as-a-Service (DaaS) [18]–[20] have gained traction
recently. Moreover, the DaaS industry is a rapidly growing one
[21] that comprises independent drone owners which provide
on-demand data collection and model training for businesses
and city planners.
Naturally, to build a better inference model, the indepen-
dently owned UAV companies can collaborate by sharing their
data collected from various sources, e.g., carparks, RSUs, and
highways, for collaborative model training. However, in recent
years, the regulations governing data privacy, e.g., General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are increasingly stringent.
As such, this can potentially prevent the sharing of data across
DaaS providers. To this end, we propose the adoption of
a Federated Learning (FL) based [22] approach to enable
privacy-preserving collaborative ML across a federation of
independent DaaS providers.
In our system model (Fig. 1), a client, hereinafter model
owner, is interested in collecting data from a region for
model training, e.g., for traffic prediction. Given the energy
constraints of UAVs [23], the region is further divided into
smaller subregions. The model owner then announces an FL
task, e.g., the capturing of real-time traffic flow over highways
or the collection of data from RSUs for model training [14].
Then, only the DaaS providers, hereinafter UAVs, that are able
to complete the task within the stipulated time and energy
constraints respond to the model owner. Thereafter, the model
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2Fig. 1: Our proposed system model involving UAV-subregion
contract-matching, and FL based collaborative learning within
a federation of multiple UAVs. Note that each hexagon indi-
cates a subregion, and within the subregion are nodes, e.g.,
RSUs, to visit as stipulated by the model owner.
owner assigns an optimal UAV to each subregion. After the
UAV collects the sensing data, model training takes place on
each UAV separately, following which only the updated model
parameters are transmitted to the model owner for global
aggregation.
Our proposed approach has three advantages. Firstly, the
resource constrained IoV components are aided by the UAV
deployment for completion of time sensitive sensing and
model training tasks. Secondly, it preserves the privacy of
the UAV-collected data through eliminating the need of data
sharing across UAVs. Thirdly, it is communication efficient.
The reason is that traditional methods of data sharing will
require the raw data to be uploaded to an aggregating cloud
server. With FL, only the model parameters need to be
transmitted by the UAVs.
However, there exists an incentive mismatch between the
model owner and the UAVs. On one hand, the model owners
aim to maximize their profits by selecting the optimal UAVs
which can complete the stipulated task at the lowest cost,
e.g., in terms of sensing, transmission, and computation costs.
On the other hand, the UAVs can take advantage of the
information asymmetry and misreport their types so as to seek
higher compensation. To that end, we leverage on the self-
revealing properties of contract theory [24] as an incentive
mechanism design to appropriately reward the UAVs based on
their actual types. In particular, given the complexity of the
sensing and collaborative learning task, we consider a multi-
dimensional contract to account for the multi-dimensional
sources of heterogeneity in terms of UAV sensing, learning,
and transmission capabilities.
After deriving optimal contracts to which the UAVs respond
to, the possibility that multiple UAVs prefer a particular
subregion still remains. To that end, we leverage on the Gale-
Shapley (GS) [25] matching-based algorithm to assign the
optimal UAVs to each subregion.
The contribution of this paper is as follows:
• We propose an FL based sensing and collaborative learn-
ing scheme in which UAVs collect the data and participate
in privacy-preserving collaborative model training for ap-
plications in the IoV paradigm towards the development
of an Intelligent Transport System.
• In consideration of the incentive mismatches and infor-
mation asymmetry between the UAVs and model owner,
we propose a multi-dimensional contract-matching based
incentive mechanism design that aims to leverage on the
self-revealing properties of an optimal contract, such that
the most optimal UAV can be matched to a subregion.
• Our incentive mechanism design considers a general UAV
sensing, computation, and transmission model, and thus
can be extended to specific FL based applications in the
IoV paradigm.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II
reviews the related works, Section III introduces the system
model and problem formulation, Section IV discusses the
multi-dimensional contract formulation, Section V consid-
ers a matching-based UAV-subregion assignment, Section VI
presents the performance evaluation of our proposed incentive
mechanism design, and Section VII concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, given the rising popularity of UAVs, there is
an increasing number of UAV-related studies in the literature.
One group of studies focus on the fundamental issues related to
the challenges of UAV deployment, e.g., trajectory optimiza-
tion [23], [26], [27], communication constraints [28], [29], as
well as the efficient assignment and deployment of UAVs [30],
[31]. Another group of studies propose specific applications of
UAVs, e.g., as flying base stations [32], with mobile cloudlets
for computation offloading [33], and for search and rescue
missions [34]. In particular, the UAVs are also increasingly
considered for providing sensing services, i.e., data collection,
[35] and for the development of IoV related applications, e.g.,
for traffic prediction [12], localization of ground vehicles [36],
and to facilitate vehicular communications [37].
The market of UAVs as service providers, e.g., in on-
demand data collection, is a rapidly growing one [21]. Given
the heterogeneity in UAV types, e.g., in energy constraints
and computation capabilities, the incentive mechanism design
for UAV systems is an important issue. The study in [38]
adopts a game theoretic approach to analyze the offloading
decisions of UAVs acting as flying cloudlets for IoT devices.
In contrast, the study in [39] proposes the contract-theoretic
approach to incentivize UAV base stations to contribute higher
transmit power for enhanced coverage over wireless networks.
In consideration of the limited availability of mobile charging
stations for UAVs, the study in [40] proposes an auction-based
3approach to efficiently assign the UAVs to specific charging
time slots so as to reduce congestion.
However, given the nascent field of FL, there are rela-
tively few works that propose FL based collaborative learning
schemes involving UAVs. To the best of our knowledge,
the study of [41] is the first to propose the implementation
of FL for joint power allocation and scheduling of UAV
swarms. With the increasingly stringent regulations related to
data privacy, the adoption of FL can facilitate collaborative
learning for the development of effective AI models, without
the exchange of potentially sensitive raw data. As such, there
is an urgent need to consider the incentive mechanism design
for FL in UAV networks.
To that end, we can take reference from the growing
literature related to incentive mechanism design for FL. For
example, the study in [42] adopts a contract-theoretic approach
to motivate workers to contribute more computation resource
for efficient FL. On the other hand, the study in [43] formulates
the Stackelberg game to analyze the inefficiency in model
update transfer. As an extension, the study in [44] uses a
Stackelberg game formulation together with Deep Reinforce-
ment Learning to design a learning-based incentive mechanism
for FL. For a comprehensive survey in this area, we refer the
readers to [45].
Apart from the traditional considerations of incentive design
in FL, the UAV systems involve other sources of heterogene-
ity in UAV types, e.g., traversal costs. As such, the multi-
dimensional sources of heterogeneity in UAVs have inspired
us to adopt the multi-dimensional contract theoretic approach
[46] in our incentive mechanism design. Moreover, in contrast
to traditional works in contract theoretic mechanism design,
our system model only involves the matching of a single,
optimal UAV type to each subregion. This necessitates the
use of the matching-based algorithm such as the GS algorithm.
The use of matching for UAVs to subregions have also been
studied in [35]. However, [35] does not have any mechanism
in place to ensure truthful reporting, while we leverage on the
self-revealing properties of contract theory to that end. While
the study of contract-matching has also been explored for re-
source allocation in vehicular fog computing [47], the contract
considered is single-dimensional with simpler considerations.
In summary, our study considers the adoption of FL to
facilitate privacy preserving sensing and collaborative learning
in the UAV services market, and proposes a multi-dimensional
contract-matching design that aims to match the most optimal
UAV to each sensing subregion, while accounting for the
multiple sources of heterogeneity in UAV types.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a network in which a model owner aims to
collect data from stipulated nodes, e.g., from RSUs or images
of segments in the highway, in a target sensing region to
fulfill a time-sensitive task. One UAV is selected by the task
publisher to cover each of the subregions. Given information
asymmetry and the multiple sources of heterogeneity in UAV
cost types, the model owner leverages on the self-revealing
properties of a multi-dimensional contract theoretic approach
to choose one UAV suited to cover each of the subregion.
After data collection, the UAV returns to their respective UAV
bases for Federated Learning (FL) based model training.
Following [35], the target sensing region can be modeled
as a graph and divided into N smaller graphs, i.e., subregions
whose set is denoted N = {1, . . . , n, . . . , N}, e.g., through
the multilevel graph partition algorithm [48]. The set of nodes
in subregion n is denoted In = {I1, . . . , In, . . . , IN} with the
node i in subregion n located at xni ∈ R3. The Euclidean
distance between two nodes i and i′ located within subregion
n, ∀i, i′ ∈ In, i 6= i′ is expressed as lni,i′ where lni,i′ = ||xni −
xni′ || <∞, i.e., all nodes are inter-accessible.
A set J = {1, . . . , j, . . . , J} of J unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAVs) are located at bases situated around the target
sensing region. Without loss of generality, we assume that
each base owns a single UAV and J ≥ N . Moreover, our
model can be easily extended to scenarios in which a UAV
swarm is required for sensing in each subregion. Denote
Cj = {C1, . . . , Cj , . . . , CJ} as the set of bases where Cj
refers to the base of UAV j located at yCj ∈ R3. The
Euclidean distance between the base of UAV j and subregion
n is expressed as lnCj , where l
n
Cj
= ||yCj − xni¯ || < ∞ and i¯
denotes the centre of the subregion.
There are two stages in our system model as follows:
1) Multi-Dimensional Contract Design: The UAV types,
e.g., sensing, traversal, and transmission costs, are pri-
vate information not known to the model owner. As
such, the model owner designs a multi-dimensional
contract to leverage on the self-revealing mechanism so
as to select the optimal UAV to cover each subregion. In
particular, the model owner can maximize its profits by
choosing the lowest cost UAV among all feasible UAVs
that can complete the task within the time constraint.
2) UAV-Subregion Assignment: Each UAV reports its type
and ranks the N subregions based on its preferences of
coverage to the FL model owner. Then, a stable UAV-
subregion matching is derived using the Gale-Shapley
(GS) algorithm. Note that each UAV’s preference can
vary across different subregions. As an illustration, we
consider a representative UAV j with base Cj and
two subregions n and n′ where ln
′
Cj
 lnCj ,∀in ∈
In and ∀in′ ∈ In′ . In this case, UAV j has to traverse a
longer distance to reach subregion n′. As such, it is able
to cover a smaller proportion of subregion n′ relative to
n due to energy and time constraints.
In the following, we consider the sensing, computation, and
data transmission model of a representative UAV.
A. UAV Sensing Model
We consider a representative UAV j tasked by the model
owner to cover a proportion of nodes in the subregion n.
Denote the node coverage assignment of UAV j in subregion
n to be Aj,n =
{
aj,ni,i′ |∀i, i′ ∈ In, i 6= i′
}
where aj,ni,i′ = 1
represents that the UAV has to fly through the segment
between nodes i and i′, and aj,ni,i′ = 0 implies otherwise.
4TABLE I: Table of commonly used notations.
Notation Description
n Subregion
j UAV
Cj Base of UAV j
lnj Total sensing distance
lnCj Total traversal distance
τ j,nP Total duration taken for traversal and sensing
Ej,nP Total energy taken for traversal and sensing
αnj Marginal cost of node coverage for sensing
ψnj Traversal cost
τ j,nC Local computation duration
Ej,nC Total energy taken for computation
βj Marginal cost of node coverage for computation
τ j,nT Total duration for transmission
ζnj Energy taken for transmission
unj UAV utility
Rnj Contractual rewards
φ Unit cost of energy for the UAV
Π Model owner profit
Ωn, ωn Contract set and individual contract
R˜ Compensation for sensing and computation costs
Rˆ Compensation for traversal and transmission costs
υ(αy , βz) Marginal cost of node coverage
Φi UAV auxiliary type
The total distance lnj traveled for sensing by UAV j under
assignment Aj,n is as follows:
lnj =
∑
i′ 6=i,i′∈In
aj,ni,i′ l
n
i,i′ . (1)
Denote θnj =
∑
i′ 6=i,i′∈In a
j,n
i,i′
|In| where | · | indicates cardinality,
i.e., θnj refers to the proportion of node coverage by UAV j
in subregion n where 0 ≤ θnj ≤ 1.
Apart from traveling between the nodes, the UAV has to
travel to and from its base. Denote the total distance traveled
by the UAV as Lnj = l
n
j +l
n
Cj
. Hereinafter, we refer to lnj as the
sensing distance, whereas lnCj refers to the traversal distance.
Following the works of [39], [49], each UAV travels with
an average velocity vj and expends a fixed propulsion power
pj = cj,1v
3
j +
cj,2
vj
throughout the task for tractability, where
cj,1 and cj,2 refers to the required power to balance the
parasitic drag caused by skin friction and required power to
balance the drag force of air redirection respectively1. Note
that the propulsion power consumed by the UAV when it
changes its direction is negligible [23]. The total duration
taken for traversal and sensing is denoted τ j,nP =
Lnj
vj
, whereas
the total energy consumed to cover the traversal and sensing
distance is as follows:
Ej,nP =
Lnj
vj
pj =
θnj l
n + lnCj
vj
pj
=
pj l
n
vj
θnj +
lnCj
vj
pj
= αnj θ
n
j + ψ
n
j , (2)
1In practice, the propulsion power is in turn a function of other factors, e.g.,
reference area of the UAV and wing aspect ratio and weight. For simplicity,
we consider that pj accounts for these factors.
where ln is the distance traveled by the UAV if it covers
all nodes, i.e., θnj = 1, α
n
j =
pj l
n
vj
and ψnj =
lnCj
vj
pj
for notation simplicity. Note that αnj represents the sensing
cost, i.e., marginal cost of node coverage for sensing in the
subregion, whereas ψnj refers to the traversal cost, i.e., the
energy cost of traveling to and from the base. A higher αnj
can imply that the UAV j requires greater propulsion power to
complete the task, e.g., due to its larger weight or wing-aspect
ratio, whereas a higher ψnj implies either a greater propulsion
power to move, or a greater traversal cost, i.e., the subregion
is farther away from the base. While the value of αnj varies
across subregions due to the varying ln, i.e., the marginal cost
of node coverage varies according to the sensing area of the
subregion, the ordering of the UAV types based on the sensing
costs is retained. On the other hand, the order of UAVs by
traversal costs varies across subregions, based on the distance
between the UAV base and each of the subregions.
B. UAV Computation Model
After the UAV j covers its assigned set of nodes fol-
lowing assignment Aj,n, it returns to the base Cj for an
FL based model training over K global iterations where
K = {1, . . . , k, . . . ,K} to minimize the global loss FK (w).
Following [50], each training iteration k consists of three
steps namely: (i) Local Computation, i.e., the UAV trains the
received global model w(k) locally using the sensing data,
(ii) Wireless Transmission, i.e., the UAV transmits the model
parameter update h(k)j to the model owner, and (iii) Global
Model Parameter Update, i.e., all parameter updates derived
from the N subregions are aggregated to derive an updated
global model w(k+1), where w(k+1) = ∪j∈N (w(k)j + h(k)j ),
which is then transmitted back to the UAVs for the (k+ 1)th
training iteration.
In general, a series of local model training is performed by
the UAV to minimize an L-Lipschitz and γ-strongly convex
local loss function Gj up to the target accuracy A∗ defined by
the model owner to derive the parameter update. Note that a
larger value of A∗ implies greater deviation from the optimal
value. Moreover, 0 < A∗ < 1, i.e., the local solution h(k)j
does not have to be trained to optimality, e.g., to reduce local
computation duration especially for time sensitive tasks. In
particular, following the formulation in [51]:
Gj
(
w(k),h
(k)
j
)
−Gj
(
w(k),h
(k)∗
j
)
≤ A∗
(
Gj
(
w(k),0
)
−Gj
(
w(k),h
(k)∗
j
))
. (3)
The FL training is completed after K = a1−A∗ global
iterations where a = 2L
2
γ2ξ and 0 ≤ ξ ≤ γL . The total local
computation duration τ j,nC is as follows:
τ j,nC = K
(
V Cjθ
n
jD
n log2(1/A
∗)
fj
)
, (4)
whereas the energy consumption of UAV j for computation is
as follows:
Ej,nC = K
(
κCjθ
j,nDnV log2(1/A
∗)f2j
)
= βjθ
n
j . (5)
5κ is the effective switched capacitance that depends on the
chip architecture [52], Cj is the cycles per bit for computing
one sample data of UAV j, θj,nDn is the unit of data
samples collected by UAV j, V log2(1/A
∗) refers to the lower
bound on number of local iterations required to achieve local
accuracy A∗ [51] where V = 2(2−Lδ)δγ , and fj refers to
the computation capacity of the UAV j, measured by CPU
cycles per second. For ease of notation, we denote βj =
κKCjD
nV log2(1/A
∗)f2j , i.e., a higher βj implies greater
energy cost for computation per additional node coverage.
Similar to αnj , the value of β
n
j varies across subregion due to
the different units of data samples available for computation.
However, the ordering of the UAV types based on computation
costs is retained.
C. UAV Transmission Model
After local computation, the wireless transmission takes
place from the selected UAVs to the model owner. For
simplicity, we denote the achievable rate of the UAV j to
be a product of its transmit power ρj and a scaling factor λnj
which covers other considerations, e.g., bandwidth allocation
and channel gain.
The total time τ j,nT taken by the UAV to upload parameter
update h(k)j of size H is as follows: τ
j,n
T = K
H
λnj ρj
. Note that
the model upload size is constant regardless of the number
of global iterations or quantity of data collected, given the
fixed dimensions of the model update. The transmission energy
consumption, denoted ζnj , is as follows:
Ej,nT = τ
j,n
T ρj = ζ
n
j . (6)
D. UAV and Model Owner Utility Modeling
The utility function of a representative UAV j covering
subregion n can be expressed as follows:
unj (θ
n
j ) = R
n
j (θ
n
j )− φ
(
Ej,nP + E
j,n
C + E
j,n
T
)
= Rnj (θ
n
j )− φ
(
αnj θ
n
j + ψ
n
j + β
n
j θ
n
j + ζ
n
j
)
,
(7)
where Rnj (θ
n
j ) refers to the contractual rewards and φ refers
to the unit cost of energy.
Following [44], [53], [54], the FL model accuracy
Υ(
∑N
n=1 θ
n
j∗D
n) is a concave function of the aggregate data
collected across N subregions by the N selected UAVs. In
particular, the inference accuracy of the model is improved
when more nodes are covered, i.e., a model trained using
data across a more comprehensive coverage of classes may
be built. Without loss of generality, we consider the aggregate
model performance to be an average of node coverage across
all regions, analogous to the Federated Averaging algorithm:
Υ
(
N∑
n=1
θnj∗D
n
)
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
log(1 + µθnj∗D
n), (8)
where µ > 0 is the system parameter. The total profit obtained
from all UAVs is thus as follows:
Π(Ω) = σΥ
(
N∑
n=1
θnj∗D
n
)
−
N∑
n=1
Rnj∗ (9)
where σ > 0 refers to the conversion parameter from model
performance to profits, and the contractual reward expense for
each selected UAV is denoted as Rnj∗ . In the next section,
we devise the optimal contract which satisfies the Individual
Rationality and Incentive Compatibility constraints.
IV. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CONTRACT DESIGN
In this section, we first consider a multi-dimensional con-
tract formulation. To solve the multi-dimensional contract, we
sort the UAV types according to an auxiliary variable which
reflects the marginal cost of node coverage. Then, we relax
the constraints for contract feasibility and include a fixed
compensation component for traversal and transmission costs
so as to solve for the optimal contract.
A. Contract Condition Analysis
Given that the sensing cost α, traversal cost ψ, computation
cost β, and transmission cost ζ are all private information
that are not precisely known by the model owner, we consider
the multi-dimensional contract theoretic incentive mechanism
design to leverage on its self-revealing properties.
The UAVs can be classified into different types to char-
acterize their heterogeneity. In particular, the UAVs can be
categorized into a set Ψ = {ψnx : 1 ≤ x ≤ X} of X traversal
cost types, set A = {αny : 1 ≤ y ≤ Y } of Y sensing cost
types, set B = {βnz : 1 ≤ z ≤ Z} of Z computation cost
types, and set C = {ζnq : 1 ≤ q ≤ Q} of Q transmission cost
types.
Without loss of generality, we also assume that the user
types are indexed in non-decreasing orders in all four dimen-
sions: 0 < ψ1 ≤ ψ2 ≤ · · · ≤ ψX , 0 < αn1 ≤ αn2 ≤ · · · ≤ αnY ,
0 < βn1 ≤ βn2 ≤ · · · ≤ βnZ , and 0 < ζn1 ≤ ζn2 ≤ · · · ≤ ζnQ. For
ease of notation, we represent a UAV of traversal cost type x,
sensing cost type y, computation cost type z, and transmission
cost type q to be that of type-(x, y, z, q).
To enforce the UAVs to truthfully reveal their private
information, we adopt a two-step procedure for the contract
design:
1) Multi-Dimensional Contract Design: We convert the
multi-dimensional problem into a single-dimensional
contract formulation following the approach in [46].
In particular, we sort the UAVs by an auxiliary, one-
dimensional type Φ(αny , β
n
z ) in the ascending order
based on the marginal cost of node coverage, i.e.,
sensing and computation cost types. Then, we solve
for the optimal contract for each subregion n denoted
Ωn(A,B) = {ωny,z : 1 ≤ y ≤ Y, 1 ≤ z ≤ Z} where
n ∈ N to derive the optimal node coverage-contract
reward bundle {θny,z, R˜ny,z}.
2) Traversal Cost Compensation: In contrast to existing
works on multi-dimensional contracts, the UAVs also
incur the additional traversal cost and transmission cost
components, both of which are not coupled with the
marginal cost of node coverage. In other words, these
costs have to be incurred regardless of the number of
nodes a UAV decides to cover in the subregion. For each
6contractual reward, we add in a fixed compensation Rˆ
to derive the final contract bundle {θny,z, (R˜ny,z + Rˆ)}.
We first discuss the multi-dimensional contract formulation
as follows. A contract is feasible only if the Individual
Rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints
hold simultaneously.
Definition 1. Individual Rationality (IR): Each type-(y, z)
UAV achieves non-negative utility if it chooses the contract
item designed for its type, i.e., contract item ωy,z .
uy,z(ωy,z) ≥ 0, 1 ≤ y ≤ Y, 1 ≤ z ≤ Z. (10)
Definition 2. Incentive Compatibility (IC): Each type-(y, z)
UAV achieves the maximum utility if it chooses the contract
item designed for its type, i.e., contract item ωy,z . As such, it
has no incentive to choose contracts designed for other types.
uy,z(ωy,z) ≥ u,y,z(ωy′,z′), 1 ≤ y ≤ Y, 1 ≤ z ≤ Z,
y 6= y′, z 6= z′. (11)
The multi-dimensional contract formulation is as follows:
max
Ω
Π(Ωn(A,B))
s.t. (10), (11). (12)
However, the optimization problem in (12) involves Y Z, i.e.,
IR constraints and Y Z(Y Z − 1), i.e., IC constraints, all of
which are non-convex. Therefore, we first convert the contract
into a single-dimensional formulation in the next section.
B. Conversion Into A Single-Dimensional Contract
In order to account for the marginal cost of node coverage,
we consider a revised utility u˜y,z of the UAV type-(y, z) that
excludes the traversal and transmission costs as follows:
u˜y,z(θ(y, z), R˜y,z) = η(αy, βz) + R˜y,z, (13)
where we denote η(αy, βz) = −φ(αyθ(y, z) + βzθ(y, z)) for
ease of notation, and R˜y,z refers to the contractual reward
arising from the multi-dimensional contract design. To focus
on a representative contract, we drop the n superscripts for
now. Given that the ranking of marginal cost types does not
change across subregion, note that our contract design is a
general one applicable to all subregions.
We derive the marginal cost of node coverage υ(αy, βz) for
the type-(y, z) UAV as follows:
υ(αy, βz) = −∂η(αy, βz)
∂θ(y, z)
= φ(αy + βz). (14)
Intuitively, ∂η(αy,βz)∂θ(y,z) < 0 since the coverage of an additional
node results in the additional expenses of sensing and com-
putation costs. A larger value of υ(αy, βz) implies a larger
marginal cost of node coverage, due to the greater sensing
and computation costs incurred for a particular UAV type.
We can now sort the Y Z UAVs according to their marginal
cost of node coverage in a non-decreasing order as follows:
Φ1(θ),Φ2(θ), . . . ,Φi(θ), . . . ,ΦY Z(θ), (15)
where Φi(θ) denotes the auxiliary type-Φi(θ) user. Given the
sorting order, the UAV types are in an ascending order based
on their marginal cost of node coverage:
υ(θ,Φ1) ≤ υ(θ,Φ2) ≤ · · · ≤ υ(θ,Φi) ≤ · · · ≤ υ(θ,ΦY Z),
(16)
Note that for ease of notation, we use type-Φi or type-
i interchangeably to represent the auxiliary type-i user. In
addition, we refer to ηi(θi) and η(θi,Φi) interchangeably
to represent the new ordering subsequently. Similarly, to
represent the marginal cost of node coverage, we use υi(θi)
and υ(θi,Φi). In the next section, we derive the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the contract design.
C. Conditions For Contract Feasibility
We derive the necessary conditions to guarantee contract
feasibility based on the IR and IC constraints as follows.
Lemma 1. For any feasible contract Ω{A,B}, we have θi <
θi′ if and only if R˜i < R˜′i, i 6= i′.
Proof. We first prove the sufficiency, i.e., if Ri < R′i ⇒ θi <
θi′ . From the IC constraint of type-Φi UAV we have:
η(θi,Φi) + R˜i ≥ η(θi,Φi′) + R˜i′ ,
η(θi,Φi)− η(θi,Φi′) ≥ R˜i′ − R˜i > 0, (17)
which implies:
η(θi,Φi) ≥ η(θi,Φi′), (18)
Given that ∂η(θi,Φi)∂θi < 0, we can deduce θi < θi′ .
Next, we prove the necessity, i.e., θi < θi′ ⇒ R˜i < R˜′i.
Similarly, we consider the IC constraint of the type-Φi UAV:
η(θi,Φi) + R˜i ≥ η(θi′ ,Φi) + R˜i′ ,
η(θi,Φi)− η(θi′ ,Φi) ≥ R˜i′ − R˜i. (19)
Given θi < θi′ , we deduce η(θi,Φi) < η(θi′ ,Φi), which
follows that R˜i′ < R˜i. The proof is now completed.
Lemma 2. Monotonicity: For any feasible contract Ω{A,B},
if υ(θi,Φi) > υ(θi,Φi′), it follows that θi ≤ θi′ .
Proof. We adopt the proof by contradiction to validate the
monotonicity condition. We first assume that there exists
θi > θi′ such that υ(θi,Φi) > υ(θi,Φi′), i.e., the lemma is
incorrect.
We consider the IC constraints for the type Φi and Φi′ UAV:
η(θi,Φi) + R˜i ≥ η(θi′ ,Φi) + R˜i′ ,
η(θi′ ,Φi′) + R˜i′ ≥ η(θi,Φi′) + R˜i.
Then, we add the constraints together and rearrange the
terms to obtain:
[η(θi,Φi)− η(θi′ ,Φi)]− [η(θi,Φi′)− η(θi′ ,Φi′)] ≥ 0. (20)
7By the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have:
[η(θi,Φi)− η(θi′ ,Φi)]− [η(θi,Φi′)− η(θi′ ,Φi′)]
=
∫ θi
θi′
∂η(θ,Φi)
∂θ
dθ −
∫ θi
θi′
∂η(θ,Φi′)
∂θ
dθ
=
∫ θi
θi′
[
∂η(θ,Φi)
∂θ
− ∂η(θ,Φi′)
∂θ
]
dθ
= −
∫ θi
θi′
[υ (θ,Φi)− υ (θ,Φi′)] dθ. (21)
Given (12), as well as the assumption θi > θi′ and η(θi,Φi) >
η(θi,Φi′), we can deduce that (21) is negative, which contra-
dicts with (20). As such, there does not exist θi > θi′ and
η(θi,Φi) > η(θi,Φi′) for the feasible contract, which confirms
that the lemma is correct. The proof is now completed.
As such, Lemmas 1 and 2 give us the necessary conditions
of the feasible contract in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. A feasible contract must meet the following
conditions:
{
θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θi ≥ · · · ≥ θY Z
R˜1 ≥ R˜2 ≥ · · · ≥ R˜i ≥ · · · ≥ R˜Y Z (22)
Next, we further relax the IR and IC constraints. Due to
the independence of Φi on the contract item {θ, R˜}, i.e.,
Φi(θ, R˜) = Φi(θ
′, R˜′), θ 6= θ′, R˜ 6= R˜′, the UAV type does
not change with the node coverage and contract rewards. In
addition, the ordering of the type by marginal costs does not
change with the subregion n. As such, we are able to deduce
the minimum utility UAV Φmax, i.e., the UAV type that incurs
the highest marginal cost of node coverage, as follows:
Φmax(θ) = arg min
Φi
u˜
(
θ, R˜,Φi
)
. (23)
Intuitively Φmax = ΦY Z , i.e., the UAV characterized by
{αY , βZ} is the UAV which incurs the highest marginal cost
of node coverage, and hence it is the minimum utility UAV.
Lemma 3. If the IR constraint of the minimum utility UAV
type ΦY Z is satisfied, the other IR constraints will also hold.
Proof. From the IC constraint and the sorting order η1(θ1) ≥
· · · ≥ ηi(θi) · · · ≥ ηY Z(θY Z), we have the following relation:
ηi(θi) + R˜i ≥ ηi(θY Z) + R˜Y Z ≥ ηY Z(θY Z) + R˜Y Z ≥ 0.
As such, as long as the IR constraint of the UAV type ΦY Z is
satisfied, it follows that the IR constraints of the other UAVs
will also hold.
Lemma 4. For a feasible contract, if ωi−1
PIC⇔ ωi and ωi PIC⇔
ωi+1, then ωi−1
PIC⇔ ωi+1.
Note that the relation ωi
PIC⇔ ωi′ , i 6= i′ implies the Pairwise
Incentive Compatibility (PIC), which is fulfilled under the
following condition:{
ui (ωi) ≥ ui (ωi′) ,
ui′ (ωi′) ≥ ui′ (ωi) .
Proof. Suppose we have three UAV types Φi−1, Φi, and Φi+1
where i − 1 < i < i + 1. The Local Upward Incentive
Constraint (LUIC), i.e., IC constraint between the ith and
(i+ 1)th UAV is as follows:
η (θi−1,Φi−1) + R˜i−1 ≥ η (θi,Φi−1) + R˜i
η (θi,Φi) + R˜i ≥ η (θi+1,Φi) + R˜i+1. (24)
In addition, we consider:
[η (θi+1,Φi)− η (θi,Φi)]− [η (θi+1,Φi−1)− η (θi,Φi−1)]
=
∫ θi+1
θi
∂η (θ,Φi)
∂θ
dθ −
∫ θi+1
θi
∂η (θ,Φi−1)
∂θ
dθ
=
∫ θi+1
θi
∂η (θ,Φi)
∂θ
− ∂η (θ,Φi−1)
∂θ
dθ
=−
∫ θi+1
θi
[υ (θ,Φi)− υ (θ,Φi−1)] dθ
=
∫ θi
θi+1
[υ (θ,Φi)− υ (θ,Φi−1)] dθ. (25)
Given the order of marginal cost of node coverage in (16), it
follows that (25) is positive. As such, we have:
η (θi+1,Φi)− η (θi,Φi) ≥ η (θi+1,Φi−1)− η (θi,Φi−1) .
(26)
Adding the LUIC inequalities presented in (33) together with
that of (26), we have:
η(θi−1,Φi−1) + R˜i−1 ≥ η(θi+1,Φi−1) + R˜i+1. (27)
By considering the Local Downward Incentive Constraint
(LDIC), i.e., IC constraint between the ith and (i− 1)th UAV,
as well as adopting the approach in (25), we are able to derive
that:
η(θi+1,Φi+1) + R˜i+1 ≥ η(θi−1,Φi+1) + R˜i−1. (28)
As such, given that the LUIC and LDIC hold, we have proven
that the PIC of the contracts hold, i.e., ωi−1
PIC⇔ ωi+1.
With Lemma 3, we are able to reduce Y Z IR constraints
into a single constraint, i.e., as long as the minimum utility
type ΦY Z UAV has a non-negative utility, it follows that the
other IR constraints will hold. Moreover, with Lemma 4, we
are able to reduce Y Z(Y Z − 1) constraints into Y Z − 1
constraints, i.e., as long as the PIC constraint of the type Φi
and type Φi+1 UAV holds, it follows that the IC constraints
between the type Φi and all other UAV types will hold.
With this, we are able to derive a tractable set of sufficient
conditions for the feasible contract in Theorem 2 as follows.
The first condition refers to the reduced IR condition corre-
sponding to Lemma (3), whereas the second condition refers
to the PIC condition between the type Φi and type Φi+1 UAV
corresponding to Lemma (4).
Theorem 2. A feasible contract must meet the following
sufficient conditions:
1) ηY Z(θY Z) + R˜Y Z ≥ 0
2) R˜i+1 + η(θi+1,Φi+1) − η(θi,Φi+1) ≥ R˜i ≥ R˜i+1 +
η(θi+1,Φi)− η(θi,Φi).
8D. Contract Optimality
To solve for the optimal contract rewards R˜∗i , we first es-
tablish the dependence of optimal contract rewards R on route
coverage θ. Thereafter, we solve the problem in (12) with θ
only. Specifically, we obtain the optimal rewards R∗(θ) given
a set of feasible node coverages from each UAV which satisfies
the monotonicity constraint θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θi ≥ · · · ≥ θY Z .
In addition, the multi-dimensional contract formulation that
we have thus far only considers the self-revelation for two
types, i.e., sensing and computation costs. To account for
traversal and transmission cost types, we add an additional
fixed compensation Rˆ into the contract rewards. The traversal
cost can be derived from the historical information of the
UAV, and can be calibrated based on the response that the
model owner receives. In the following theorem, we prove
that the addition of a fixed rewards compensation does not
violate the IC constraints, i.e., the self-revealing properties of
the contract is still preserved, whereas it is inconsequential
even if the IR constraint is violated, given that R˜ has already
been designed to sufficiently compensate marginal costs, and
only one optimal UAV is required to serve each subregion.
The optimal rewarding scheme is summarized as follows.
Theorem 3. For a known set of node coverage θ satisfying
θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θi ≥ · · · ≥ θY Z in a feasible contract, the
optimal reward is given by:
R∗i =
{
Rˆ− η(θi,Φi), if i = Y Z,
Rˆ+ R˜i+1 + η(θi+1,Φi)− η(θi,Φi), otherwise.
(29)
Proof. There are two parts to the proof. Firstly, we prove
that the reward design for the two-dimensional contract is
optimal. Therefore, we adopt the proof by contradiction. We
first assume there exists some R† that yields greater profit
for the model owner, meaning that the theorem is incorrect,
i.e., Π(R†) > Π(R∗). For simplicity, we need to consider
only the rewards portion of the model owner’s profit function
in this proof, i.e.,
∑Y Z
i=1R
†
i <
∑Y Z
i=1R
∗
i . This implies there
exists at least a t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Y Z} that satisfies the inequality
R†t < R
∗
t .
According to the PIC constraint of Lemma (4), we have:
R†t ≥ R†t+1 + η (θt+1,Φt+1)− η (θt,Φt) . (30)
In contrast from Theorem 3, we have:
R∗t = R
∗
t+1 + η (θt+1,Φt+1)− η (θt,Φt) . (31)
From (30) and (31), we can deduce that R†t+1 < R
∗
t+1.
Continuing the process up to t = Y Z, we R†Y Z ≤ R∗Y Z =
−η(θi,Φi), which violates the IR constraint. As such, there
does not exist the rewards R† in the feasible contract that
yields greater profit for the model owner. Intuitively, the model
owner chooses the lowest reward that satisfies the IR and IC
constraints for profit maximization.
Secondly, we show that adding a fixed traversal cost reward
does not violate the IC constraint. Within a subregion, when
we consider the complete utility function of the auxiliary UAV
with type i, i 6= i′,
η (θi,Φi) + R˜i + Rˆ−ψni − ζni ≥
η (θi′ ,Φi) + R˜i + Rˆ− ψni − ζni . (32)
Intuitively, the traversal and transmission cost are structurally
separate from the marginal costs, i.e., sensing and computation
cost types of the UAV within a subregion n. As such, the fixed
reward terms cancel out and the self-revealing properties of the
contract is preserved.
Note that the IR constraint may no longer hold for some i
where
ψi > η (θi,Φi) + R˜i + Rˆ
n. (33)
However, this is inconsequential given that unlike the con-
ventional contract theoretic formulations, we only require a
type of UAV to serve a subregion. Moreover, R˜ is already
designed such that the IR constraints hold to compensate
marginal costs sufficiently. For certain subregions, Rˆ can be
calibrated upwards if no UAV responds to the model owner.
Following (29), we can re-express the optimal rewards as:
R∗i = Rˆ− η(θY Z ,ΦY Z) +
Y Z∑
t=i
∆t, (34)
where ∆Y Z = 0, ∆t = η(θi+1,Φi) − η(θi,Φi), and t =
1, 2, . . . , Y Z − 1.
Unlike conventional contract theoretic formulations, the
model owner only requires a single contract per subre-
gion n for the optimal UAV. From (9), we can deduce
that the optimal type-i∗ UAV to serve each subregion is
i∗ = arg maxΦi∈ΦΠ(Ω{A,B}) = arg minΦi∈Φ Φi = Φ1.
Intuitively, for each region, the model owner leverages on
the self-revealing properties of the multi-dimensional contract
formulation to obtain an optimal UAV with the lowest marginal
cost of node coverage for profit maximization. In other words,
this is the UAV that can cover the largest proportion of the
subregion at the lowest cost, among all feasible UAVs that can
complete the task. We can substitute the optimal rewards into
the profit function of the model owner and rewrite the profit
maximization problem as follows:
max
(R,θn
i∗ )
Π(Ωn) =
N∑
n=1
Gn(θn1 ),
s.t.
C1 : θn1 ≥ θn2 ≥ · · · ≥ θni ≥ · · · ≥ θnY Z ,
C2 : 0 ≤ θn1 ≤ 1, (35)
where:
Gn =
σ
N
log(1 + µθn1D
n)−R∗1
=
σ
N
log(1 + µθn1D
n)− Rˆ− φ(αn1 θn1 + β1θn1 ).
Note that C1 refers to the monotonicity constraint of the
contract whereas C2 specifies the upper and lower bounds of
the route coverage. Taking the first order derivative of (35) to
9solve for θn∗1 , we can derive the closed form solution of the
optimal node coverage-contract reward pair as follows:
θn∗1 =
1
µDn
(
σ
Nφ(α1+β1)
− 1
)
,
R∗i = Rˆ− η(θY Z ,ΦY Z) +
∑Y Z
t=i ∆t.
(36)
Following (36), we are able to derive an optimal node
coverage-contract reward pair upon the announcement of the
UAV types. If the derived contract pairs satisfy the monotonic-
ity conditions, they are the optimal contract formulation. Oth-
erwise, we use the iterative adjusted algorithm, i.e., “Bunching
and Ironing” algorithm [55], to return the results that satisfy
the monotonicity constraint.
Note that to derive the optimal rewards for any type-i∗
UAV, it is necessary to obtain the rewards for type-i∗ + 1, . . . ,
type-Y Z UAV. However, since there can only be one selected
UAV for each subregion, the reward for the (i∗ + 1)th UAV
and onward has to be zero in practice. As such, to compute
the rewards, we first assume the type-Y Z UAV is selected to
obtain a hypothetical RY Z . With this, we can then work from
backwards, towards deriving RY Z−1, . . . , Ri∗ . Thereafter, the
model owner specifies route assignment A1,n for the optimal
UAV such that θn∗1 =
∑
i′ 6=i,i′∈In a
1,n
i,i′
|In| .
In the next section, we consider the UAV-subregion assign-
ment.
V. UAV-SUBREGION ASSIGNMENT
In this section, we consider the matching-based UAV-
subregion assignment using the GS algorithm. In Section IV,
we note that the optimal UAV for each subregion has to be
the lowest UAV type, i.e., type-1 UAV. However, given that
all subregions will prefer type-1 UAV, there exist a need to
consider a two-side matching such that the optimal UAVs are
matched to the subregions efficiently.
A. Matching Rules
We introduce a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary
preference relation [56], i.e., “” to study the preferences of
the UAV. For example, n j n′ implies that the UAV j strictly
prefers subregion n to n′, whereas n j n′ indicates that the
UAV j prefers the subregion n at least as much as UAV j′.
We also consider the core definitions as follows:
Definition 3. Matching: For the formulated matching problem
(J ,N ,Pn,Pj), where J and N denote the set of UAVs and
the set of subregions respectively, whereas Pn and Pj denote
the preferences of the subregions and UAVs respectively. The
matching M(j) = n indicates that the UAV j has been
matched to subregion n, whereas the matching M(j) = ∅
implies that the UAV j has not been matched to any subregion.
Definition 4. Propose Rule: The UAV j ∈ J announces its
type to all the eligible subregions based on feasibility of task
completion. Then, the contract is formulated and the subregion
proposes to its most preferred UAV j∗ in its preference set Pn ,
i.e., n∗ j n∗′, n∗∀n ∈ N , n∗ 6= n∗′. Note that the preference
of the subregion is managed by the FL model owner.
Algorithm 1 GS Algorithm for UAV-Subregion Assignment
1: Input: N , τ¯n,J ,Ψ,A,B, C, Ej
2: Output: M∗(j),∀j ∈ J
3: Phase I: Initialization
4: if τ j,nP (θˆ) + τ
j,n
C (θˆ) + τ
j,n
T ≤ τ¯n(θˆ) then
5: UAV j ∈ J report types αnj , βnj to subregion n
6: Sort Φ(αnj , β
n
j ) in an ascending order to derive Pn
7: Set R = N , M = ∅
8: Phase II: Iterative Matching
9: while R 6= ∅ and Pn 6= ∅, ∀n ∈ R do
10: for n in R do
11: j∗ = arg minΦi∈Φ Φi
12: Formulate (θnj∗ , R
n
j∗) and propose contract
13: while n has more than one optimal UAV do
14: R˜n = R˜n −∆R˜n
15: if unj∗(θnj∗) > un
′
j∗(θ
n′
j∗) then
16: M(j∗) = n
17: Remove n from R and add n′ to R
18: else
19: Remove j∗ from Pn
Definition 5. Reject Rule: The UAV j ∈ J rejects the
subregion if a better matching candidate exists. Otherwise, the
subregion that is not rejected will be retained as a matching
candidate.
However, given that the subregion preference for UAV
type is only based on two of four type dimensions, i.e.,
marginal costs, some subregions may have multiple preferred
UAVs with the same marginal costs. To that end, adopting
the approach in [47], we introduce the rewards calibration
rule by adjusting the traversal and transmission compensation
downward to further reduce the number of eligible UAVs
matched to each subregion.
Definition 6. Rewards Calibration Rule: For the subregion
n ∈ N that has more than one optimal UAV matched, the
contractual rewards can be adjusted downwards, following
which the preference of the UAVs are renewed for another
iteration of matching. The adjustment is as follows:
R˜n = R˜n −∆R˜n. (37)
B. Matching Implementation and Algorithm
We now explain the implementation procedure of the UAV-
subregion assignment.
Phase 1: Initialization
• The model owner announces the sensing subregions and
time constraint τ¯n for task completion to all UAVs in J .
Since θnj is not known apriori, the time limit for task
completion can be a function of the variable θˆ specified
by the model owner, e.g., θˆ = 0.8, i.e., only UAVs that
can complete 80% of the route coverage should announce
their types (Line 4 of Algorithm 1).
• The UAVs announce their types αnj , β
n
j to the feasible
subregions (Line 5), i.e., subregions in which the UAVs
are able to meet the requirements for task completion.
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• We initialize (Lines 6, 7):
– M as an empty set
– R as the set of subregions that have yet to be
matched, i.e., R = N at initialization
– Pn as the set of subregion preferences based on
the ascending order of marginal costs Φ(αnj , β
n
j ) as
discussed in Section IV-D.
Phase 2: Iterative Matching
Each iteration of matching consists of the four stages.
• Proposal: For each subregion n ∈ R, the node coverage-
contract reward pair is formulated for the most optimal
UAV j∗ = arg minΦi∈Φ Φi in the preference set Pn.
Then, the subregion proposes to an optimal UAV (Lines
11-12).
• Rewards Calibration: If the subregion has more than one
optimal UAV, the contract reward is calibrated downward
until a one-to-one matching is achieved (Line 13-14).
• Rejection: If the UAV has a better matching candidate
unj∗(θ
n
j∗) < u
n′
j∗(θ
n′
j∗), the subregion is rejected. If not,
the UAV keeps the subregion as a matching candidate.
• Update: If a subregion has been matched, remove it
from R (Line 17). If a prevailing matching candidate
has been rejected, add it back to R (line 17). Update Pn
by removing the UAV that has issued a rejection in this
iteration (Line 19).
The iterations are repeated until all subregions have been
matched, i.e., R = ∅, or the remaining subregion has been
rejected by all UAVs in its preference list, i.e., Pn = ∅. The
pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 1.
The stability and optimality properties of the GS algo-
rithm are ensured following the proofs in [57]. As such,
the self-revealing properties of our multi-dimensional contract
design assures truthful type reporting, whereas the matching
algorithm ensures that only one optimal UAV is matched to
each region. In the following, we perform the performance
evaluation of our incentive design.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we consider the optimality of our devised
contract. To illustrate the contract optimality, we first consider
the case of six UAVs and a single subregion. Then, we
study a single iteration of matching between 5 UAVs and 3
subregions. Finally, we study the GS matching-based UAV-
subregion assignment that involves up to 7 UAVs and 6
subregions. Unless otherwise stated, the list of value ranges
for the key simulation parameters are as summarized in Table
II. The key parameters we use are with reference to studies
involving UAV and FL optimization [49], [51].
A. Contract Optimality
To illustrate the optimality of our multi-dimensional contract
design, we first consider a highly simplified and demonstrative
case of a single subregion and six UAVs of ascending marginal
cost of route coverage. The values of α for the UAVs lie
in the range of [250, 875], with increments of 125, whereas
the β values lie in the range of [20, 70], with increments of
TABLE II: Table of Key Simulation Parameters
Simulation Parameters Value
UAV Sensing and Traversal Parameters
p 10 - 35
v 10 - 20 m/s
ln 1000 - 2000 m
lnCj 500 - 1000 m
UAV Computation Parameters
L 4
ε 1
3
δ 1
4
γ 2
A∗ 0.6
ε 1
3
C 10− 30 cycles/bit
K 24
V 4
κ 10−28
f 2 GHz
UAV Transmission Parameters
Dn 500− 1000 MB
λn 10000− 15000
H 1 MB
ρ 8− 18
UAV and Model Owner Utility Parameters
φ 0.05
µ 1
σ 100000
10. The values are varied as presented in Table II. Then, the
auxiliary types are derived following (16), and arranged in an
ascending order for contract derivation. Type-1 UAV has the
lowest marginal cost of node coverage, whereas type-6 UAV
has the highest marginal cost of node coverage. To focus our
study on the optimality of our contract design, we hold the
traversal and transmission cost types of the UAV constant for
now. In addition, we assume that all the UAVs can complete
the task within the time constraints.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 consider the hypothetical scenarios in
which each particular UAV type takes turn to be matched
to the subregion. As an illustration, if UAV type-1 has been
matched to serve the subregion, the optimal node coverage is
1, whereas the contractual rewards is 35. In contrast, if UAV
type-6 is matched, the optimal node coverage is close to 0.4,
whereas the rewards is 20. From Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we can
observe that the monotonicity condition discussed in Theorem
1 holds. In other words, the higher is the marginal cost of node
coverage, the lower is the optimal node coverage and contract
rewards.
Fig. 4 shows that the IC constraints of the contract holds.
As an illustration, we consider the type-6 UAV, i.e., the UAV
with the maximum marginal cost of node coverage. The type-
6 UAV derives negative utility if it misreports its type, i.e.,
to imitate any other lower marginal cost UAV types 1 − 5.
As discussed in Definition (2), each UAV derives the highest
utility only if it reports its type truthfully to the model owner.
This validates the self-revealing mechanism of our contract.
Fig. 5 shows that the model owner profits are the highest
when it is able to be matched with the UAV of the lowest
marginal cost of node coverage. This validates our discussion
in Section IV-D, and confirms the model owner preference. In
other words, among UAVs that are able to complete the task,
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Fig. 6: The UAV utility for each subregion vs. types.
the model owner prefers the UAV that incurs the lowest cost.
B. UAV-Subregion Preference Analysis
To analyze the preferences of the UAVs and subregions
before we proceed with matching, we consider 5 UAV types
and 2 subregions. In particular, the auxiliary types of the UAVs
are shown in Table III. Similarly, the types are derived from
the calibration of the parameters listed in Table II. The UAVs
are sorted in the ascending order based on marginal cost of
TABLE III: UAV Types For Preference Analysis.
UAV Type Coordinates α β Subregion Preference
1 (100, 100) 500 20 (2, 3, 1)
2 (900, 900) 500 20 (1, 3, 2)
3 (400, 400) 750 30 (3, 2, 1)
4 (450, 450) 750 30 (3, 2, 1)
5 (500, 500) 1000 40 (3)
node coverage. Besides, we consider three subregions 1, 2, 3 of
coordinates (1000, 1000), (50, 50), (500, 500). The subregion
preference for each UAV is also presented in the last column
of Table III.
Following our discussion in Section IV-D, the subregions
prefer the UAV types with lower marginal cost. Naturally,
the preferences for all three subregions are similar as follows:
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Note that the subregions are indifferent between
types 1 and 2, as well as types 4 and 5 given that the pairs
have the same marginal cost of node coverage.
To consider the UAV preferences, we plot the potential
profits that each UAV may gain from covering the different
subregions in Fig. 6. Note that this profit is a hypothetical
one in some cases, since the profits can only be realized if
the UAV has been matched to cover the subregion. However,
given that the UAV is not aware if it will be matched to the
subregion apriori, the preference list of the UAV can only
be constructed with the assumption that it is indeed matched
to the subregion. We note that UAV 1 prefers subregion 2,
whereas UAV 2 prefers subregion 1 and so on. Intuitively,
the preference for subregions relies on the traversal costs, i.e.,
the cost of traveling to and from the subregion. As such, the
preferences for the UAVs 1 and 2 are (2, 3, 1) and (1, 3, 2)
respectively.
On the other hand, the UAV 5 prefers only the closest region
3, given the potential negative profits derived if it serves the
other two subregions, as a result of the high marginal costs
incurred for task completion. As such, we are able to derive
the matching of (Region 2, UAV 1) and (Region 1, UAV 2)
given that the UAV-subregion preferences match perfectly.
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Fig. 9: UAV matching where J > N .
The consideration for subregion 3 is clearly more challeng-
ing than that of 1 and 2 given that the subregion is indifferent
between the two remaining UAVs 3 and 4, and that the UAVs
also rank the subregion highest, in terms of preference. To
that end, we consider the rewards calibration rule proposed in
Definition 6. The contract rewards are calibrated downwards
till a UAV emerges as the only choice left. In this case, after
the downward calibration of rewards R˜, UAV 4 will clearly
be matched with subregion 3, given its close proximity to the
subregion.
Through this relatively straightforward example, we are able
to derive an insight, i.e., a successful match will have the
lowest marginal cost type UAVs matched to the subregion
that it is situated closest to. Clearly, Fig. 6 also validates the
efficiency of our incentive mechanism design, i.e., the best
available UAV is matched to the respective subregion.
C. Matching-Based UAV-Subregion Assignment
In this section, we consider the matching-based UAV-
subregion assignment. In particular, we consider three scenar-
ios to illustrate the matching-based assignment.
In the first scenario, six UAVs of ascending marginal cost
types are initialized to choose among six subregions that are
of varying distances from each UAV. Each of the subregions is
calibrated to hold the same quantities of data (Dn) and sensing
area (ln) for coverage. For ease of exposition, the UAVs are all
able to complete their tasks within their energy capacities and
stipulated time constraint. The coordinates of the subregions
and UAVs, as well as the matching outcomes, are presented
in Fig. 7. The preference list of the UAVs are presented in
Table IV. Note that the preference list of each subregion is
simply (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), i.e., among all feasible UAVs that can
cover the subregion within the time and energy constraints,
the UAV with the lowest marginal cost is preferred.
From Fig. 7, we observe that the UAV 1 is matched to
its most preferred subregion 6. Though UAV 2 also prefers
subregion 6, it is unable to be matched to the subregion given
that UAV 1 is higher up on the list of preferences of subregion
6. As such, UAV 2 is matched to its second choice. Naturally,
the matching between UAV 3 and subregion 3, UAV 4 and
subregion 2, as well as UAV 5 and subregion 5 is intuitive,
given the unavailability of the other more preferred UAVs for
the subregions to match with. We observe that UAV 6 is finally
matched with its fifth choice, given that the UAV 6 has the
lowest priority among subregions.
In the second scenario, we consider the same UAV types but
with heterogeneous subregions of different data quantities and
sensing areas for coverage. As was expected, the sizes of the
regions do not affect the matching outcomes and the matching
remains the same (Fig. 8). This is given that the preference
rankings of the subregion and the UAV remain constant. While
the varying values of Dn and ln affects the magnitude of
UAV types, the ordering of the UAV types, and thus their
preferences, is retained. This is important to ensure that the
monotonicity of our contract design holds across subregions,
so as to preserve the contract optimality.
In the third scenario, we consider the case where J > N ,
i.e., the number of UAVs exceed that of the number of
subregions available. As an illustration, we add in the UAV 7,
which has the lowest marginal cost of node coverage relative to
that of the other six available UAVs from the aforementioned
scenarios. We observe from Fig. 9 that the matching outcomes
have changed. UAV 7 is now matched with its most preferred
subregion, i.e., subregion 6, in place of UAV 1. Naturally, this
affects the assignment for the other UAVs. For example, UAV
1 has to be matched to its second choice now, whereas UAV 2
has to be matched to its third choice. We observe that the UAV
of the largest type, i.e., UAV 6 is left out of the assignment
as a result.
The simulation results allow us to validate the efficiency
of our mechanism design. Firstly, the contract design ensures
truthful type reporting and the incentive compatibility of our
contract is validated. Secondly, with consideration of the
preferences, the available UAV with the lowest marginal cost
of node coverage is matched to the subregion. This ensures
the profit maximization of the model owner.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered an FL based sensing and
collaborative learning scheme involving UAVs for applications
in the IoV paradigm. Given the incentive mismatches between
the UAVs and the model owners, we have proposed a multi-
dimensional contract-matching incentive design such that the
UAV with the lowest marginal cost of node coverage is
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TABLE IV: UAV Type and Preference for Subregions.
UAV Type Subregion Preference
1 (6, 1, 5, 2, 3, 4)
2 (6, 1, 5, 3, 2, 4)
3 (3, 4, 5, 1, 2, 6)
4 (2, 5, 6, 1, 3, 4)
5 (2, 5, 3, 4, 1, 6)
6 (1, 5, 3, 6, 4, 2)
assigned to each subregion for task completion. For future
works, we may consider the adoption of wireless charging
techniques with energy harvesting [58] such that the UAVs can
perform sensing and model training simultaneously, without
the need to return to their bases. In that case, the incentive
mechanism design will involve the considerations of one more
player type, i.e., the wireless charging service provider.
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